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John Wanna, Joanne Kelly and John Forster (2000) Managing Public Expenditures in
Australia. St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin. 352 pp.
Published works on public sector budgeting in the U.S. are numerous and include some
that have become classics known around the world, e.g., Aaron Wildavsky's The
Politics of the Budgetary Process first issued in 1964. Often in the past when I have
searched for comprehensive works on public budgeting in other nations I have been
disappointed. However, in Europe and elsewhere a number of studies on budgeting have
appeared in the past decade. While much has been written about Australian accounting
and financial management, with quite a bit of analysis of the reforms undertaken over
the past several decades, until Managing Public Expenditures in Australia appeared in
2000 there was no work on budgeting in this nation that might be considered a classic.
While only time will tell about the utility and staying power of this work as a textbook
and research reference, it falls into a category of "potential classic" in my view. I expect
there will be sufficient demand to compel the authors to publish revised editions over
the years to keep the book relevant to changes in Australian budgeting in the future.
John Wanna is a well-known and widely respected scholar in Australia and
internationally. He is coeditor of the Australian Journal of Public Administration. He
has conducted research on budgeting in Canberra for a number of years along with
colleague John Forster, and more recently with Forster and Joanne Kelly. For one year
Wanna was a visiting scholar in the Department of Finance of the government of
Australia as part of a research project on national budgeting sponsored through the
Centre for Australian Public Sector Management (CAPSM) at Griffith University in
Brisbane. Forster is former Director of CAPSM and co-editor with Wanna of Budgetary
Management and Control, (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1990). Joanne Kelly is former
CAPSM research associate now serving as Principal Research Officer in the Treasury
Board Secretariat in Ottawa. Wanna and Forster organized a book with OECD on the
changing role of central budget agencies in ten counties that will appear in 2003.
Recently, Wanna has been part of a research team advising the Scottish government on
participatory forms of budget formulation and authorization. Other books by Wanna and
co-authors include Public Policy in Australia (1993) and Public Sector Management in
Australia (1999).
This book is a tour de force historical and analytical compendium of budgeting,
financial management and managerial reform in Australian national government. It is
comprehensive, well organized and well written. Citations are numerous and
appropriate, demonstrating that the authors have read and understand the literature on
politics, public budgeting and management in Australia and elsewhere. An excellent
index is provided along with a useful list of abbreviations and acronyms. The book
covers the Australian political, budgetary, financial and managerial reform experience
from the 1960s to 2000 -- an ambitious undertaking. The authors begin with an
introduction to public expenditure management and budgetary behavior, followed by a
chapter explaining the Australian budgetary system. Succeeding chapters provide detail
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on the promise of budgetary reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, the three roles of the
Treasury, Treasury reform, the paradox of the Fraser years (more control and more
spending), budget reform under the Hawke government, the Financial Management
Improvement Programme (FMIP) of the 1980s, the Keating government spending spree
and resultant deficits, expenditure management under the conservative Howard
government, and analysis on cutting budgets and managing surpluses. The final chapter
addresses the question: "Is Public Expenditure Better Managed Now?" They conclude
that while the implementation and impact of reforms lags their introduction by a
considerable margin, Australian expenditure management is better managed now than it
was before the era of significant reform began. However, they caution, " Whether
Australia's path of financial-driven reforms is good, bad or neutral will depend largely
on cultural and ideological beliefs - what it is that one expects of government and how
one views the nature and role of the public sector." (313) They also conclude that the
history and flow of Australian budgeting has been and is incremental generally, "...but it
is not just incremental...there is scope for more significant adjustments, for periodic re-
allocation and for strategic considerations..." that produce non-incremental budgetary
and financial management change. Their conclusion holds for most jurisdictions,
including U.S. state and federal government budgeting.
What is most interesting and compelling about the story told by Wanna, Kelly and
Forester? As all budgeteers or former budget analysts know, the devil is in the details.
The authors start by pointing out an essential contradiction with respect to public
policy-making and budgeting. Does policy drive budgets or does budgeting drive
policy? "[B]udgets make governments powerful, yet budgets exert enormous power
over governments. The instrument that should be a tool of government instead becomes
its organising principle and its focus...the budget tail wags the government dog."
(Wanna, Kelly and Forester, 2000: 3) Policy decisions frame the obligations that
budgets must satisfy, but doing so often commits a high percentage of revenues to
existing commitments, leaving little room to fund new policy initiatives. Under the
worst of circumstances, revenue shortfalls force cuts in the existing base and withdrawal
of services. Governments and budgets are slaves to economic circumstance. The best
budgetary plans and controls cannot prevent deficits during economic slumps. And,
paradoxically, when economies provide prosperity, pent-up spending and service
demand and political preferences for responsible fiscal policy in the form of tax cuts eat
up surpluses quickly. This scenario has played itself out in Australia, and is familiar to
students of fiscal policy and budgeting in the U. S. and elsewhere.
The politics of budgeting in Westministerian systems including Australia are carried out
in secrecy not found in separation of powers systems such as those of the U.S,
Switzerland and other nations. The budget and especially revenue policy changes are
kept secret until tabled by the government. Thus, much of the inevitable budget
wrangling and trading off involved in budget formulation takes place in secret meetings
away from the view of the political opposition, the media and the public. Understanding
this dynamic is essential for students of budgeting in Westministerian systems. The
authors indicate that budget secrecy and the centrality of budgetary influence to the
Prime Minister, cabinet and party in power places the media in an adversarial role
towards the government in many circumstances. When the budget is presented to
Parliament enormous attention is fixed on modifications in tax policy and transfer
payments. However, despite this attention, enduring focus on public expenditure
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management is absent (an explanation of their definition of public expenditure
management is provided in clear and concise terms, assisted by useful graphics). Why is
this so? The authors assert that the answer lies in the fact that Australia has run a tight
budget ship and budget deficits and surpluses have not been large compared to other
nations. They point out however that Australian government spending has continued to
grow as a percentage of GDP, despite the promises of successive governments and
Prime Ministers to reverse this trend -- does this sound familiar?
The book advances several key arguments. "Budgets and the attendant processes have
emerged as the main internal organising mechanism of the modern state." (11) "One
after another, Australian governments have been satisfied with their budgetary systems
and processes. Indeed, dissatisfaction seems a perennial malady." (12) This has caused a
continual search for better systems and practices. "Thus evolution led by pragmatic
experimentation becomes the norm in budget reform." (13) And, as elsewhere, budget
reform is highly political -- reform inevitably produces winners and losers.
Additionally, winning is never permanent. The next government can and often does
reverse many of the budgetary policies of its predecessor(s).
Much of the book is devoted to highly interesting description and analysis of the reform
initiatives of successive governments. A critical difference between reform in Australia
and that of separation of powers systems will be evident to knowledgeable readers.
Concentration of political power under a government that rules Parliament enables more
ambitious, innovative and, in some cases, more comprehensive reform than generally is
possible under a separation of powers system (my conclusion -- the authors provide a
more complex explanation that partially contradicts it). This alone makes a recounting
and scrutinizing of the stream of Australian reform initiatives important reading to
international scholars of budgeting. The reason this book is essential reading owes
primarily to the fact that reforms contemplated but not tried in earnest in the U. S. and
elsewhere have been executed in Australia, with consequent learning and evolution the
result.
On this point the authors explain that, compared to other nations, reform in Australia
has been driven more by public administrators rather than by ministers. And reform was
not based on theory (unlike New Zealand's public choice-driven reform agenda for
example, or Switzerland's NPM-orientation). "Rather, a culture developed among senior
guardian officials conducive to reform-minded initiatives...ministers gave their
imprimatur or tacit acceptance...[but] officials drove the reform agendas...it is also clear
that they were not always sure of where they were heading or the consequences of their
actions." (313) The Australian experience as recounted in the book is similar to the
program budget reform experimentation that the author of this review participated in as
a budget analyst for the California Department of Finance during the Reagan
administration. I submit that most, but not all, government budget reform is driven (i.e.,
planned and executed) by high level budget officials -- but only after elected officials
have issued political license and provided the necessary rhetoric to pave the way for
change.
While it is not possible to recount with any degree of comprehensiveness the story of
the Australian budgetary experience in a short book review -- and to do so might even
reduce incentive to read the book -- some of the more interesting developments and
consequences may be highlighted. The Treasury developed what became known as
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forward financial estimates (FE) to facilitate planning and control in the 1960s and used
this mechanism internally in the way they were first constructed through the mid-1970s.
Treasury forward estimates were "unofficial" and not viewed by Treasury officials as
precise or time consuming to prepare. More importantly, they were not intended as any
type of commitment to spend. Preparation and use of estimates for existing programs
was routine, involved few numbers of staff, and was invisible to the political
environment. A post-WW II penchant for short-term attempts at macro-economic
management by Treasury limited its attention to budget management and control
anyway. Consequently, forward financial estimates were not viewed as very important
by Treasury or anyone else. However, by the early-1970s the role and importance of
forward estimates changed: they began to be circulated and discussed in cabinet.
In 1971, with support from PM McMahon, the Treasury announced a new and more
open process for FE preparation. The intent was straightforward -- to provide
government better information for decision making. Spending departments became
more involved with Treasury to make forward estimates accurate. Somewhere along the
line department estimates began to be approved by ministers, providing something not
originally intended -- a perception of some form of commitment. And it the micro-
politics of budgeting (between departments, agencies and Treasury) informal
projections evolved into "declared bids" for future resources. We observe here what we
understand from research (McCaffery and Jones, 2001: 203-224) and experience -- good
budgeteers learn quickly how to use new systems to their advantage the world over. Not
surprisingly, from its perspective of spending controller, Treasury was not particularly
keen on having forward estimates viewed as any sort of commitments. None-the-less, a
succession of Treasurers promoted the use of forward estimates.
The nature of the process for estimates planning evolved to greater complexity.
Spending, revenues and staffing were projected and aggregated by Treasury, a
preparation cycle emerged, and staff time devoted to preparation and review of
estimates expanded greatly. The first Forward Estimates Report was issued by Treasury
in 1972. In 1975 an Expenditure Review Committee of Cabinet was established to
discipline the expenditure planning process. By 1977 a Task Force on Forward
Estimates criticized the accuracy of the FEs in the out-years. Because Treasury had not
regarded the FEs as very important, accuracy was an inevitable problem. In addition,
economic uncertainty and high rates of inflation in the mid-1970s (due largely to oil
shock) raised havoc with projection making in the public and private sectors. Treasury
grew frustrated and "disillusioned" with the bottom-up FE process. A survey of
departments in 1983 revealed similar sentiments. Still, control agents behave
predictably: "Paradoxically, Treasury became increasingly interested in using
expenditure estimates to provide expenditure control at the time the deficiencies with
the estimates process began to emerge..." (66) During the evolution of the FE process,
departments still had to negotiate their base-line budgets annually internally and with
Treasury, and actual budgets seldom matched the forward estimates. So, what real
purposes were served by having the estimates? More on this is provided below.
In 1983 the government agreed to publish the FE Report to set formal budget targets.
Department estimates were to become precise with attendant accountability. Due to
complex machinations in Australian politics, the role of Treasury in the budget process
had been taken over by the Department of Finance (DOF) by this time. Political
frustration with the intransigence of Treasury to its role as conservator of the public fisc
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and other factors led the Fraser government to split it in 1976 and move its budget
responsibilities to a quickly created DOF. In an interview Fraser later explained that he
had punitively "[cut] them down to size." The story of this split is bloody and will not
be recounted here. DOF was intent on establishing its own process for estimating and
deciding upon what were termed running costs, i.e., the base-line budgets of
departments and agencies.
Up to this point in history Australia had been relatively unambitious with respect to
experimentation with budgetary reform of the types implemented in other nations,
PPBS, ZBB, etc. This was to change in the 1980s. This change has to be understood in
context. Treasury had attempted micro-economic management and played the roles of
accountant and controller under a succession of conservative governments. It then
responded begrudgingly to the spending splurges of the McMahon and then the
Whitlam Labor government elected in 1972 after 25 years of Liberal (conservative)
rule. After 1976 with DOF at the budget helm, the Fraser Coalition government (1975-
83) professed control of spending while doing the opposite, as noted. A group referred
to as the "Razor Gang" attempted to cut government functions in 1980-81 as a mean of
reducing spending but was not successful. However, they left a legacy that arguably
influenced the perceptions and behavior of future governments. The DOF moved
steadily to institutionalize its role as budget examiner and controller, applying a "hands-
on" style of management, essentially carrying on the practices of the Treasury it
succeeded.
In its first term and in more pronounced fashion in its second term through 1983 the
Fraser government recognized the need for expenditure control. It chose as one
mechanism to achieve its goal making expenditure estimates "more accurate and
rigorous." Out-year control became important. Because by this time approximately two-
thirds of expenditures were non-discretionary, the problem of expenditure control was
compounded. High interest rates in the 1970s further exasperated the problem of deficit
avoidance. As early as 1976 politically expedient in-year across the board budget
cutting had been practiced. Top-down spending and personnel ceiling also were
imposed. Departmental cash limits were controlled by DOF. The "latitude" of
departments to shift spending to future years was constrained. The Fraser government
also tried to avoid making new program commitments. Despite these efforts, the
commitments of previous governments expanded spending in non-discretionary
accounts. The die had been cast to expand future spending unless commitments were
rescinded or some other tack was to be taken.
Following appointment of a new Finance Minister (Guilfoyle) in 1980, a process known
as "bi-lateral negotiations" was established to enable DOF and departments to negotiate
budget decisions. Later in the mid-1980s "portfolio budgeting" was introduced. Similar
to practice in Canada at this time, a form of what the Canadians termed envelope
budgeting was employed in Australia to set limits on what could be spent in total in the
various ministry portfolios. Spending limits were established by government from the
top down. The Reagan administration in the U.S. also was in the process of
implementing top-down budget ceilings through the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) under Director David Stockman during this period. And, of course, the Thatcher
government in the UK was developing and implementing its reforms during this period
as well. In Australia, under Guilfoyle program-based budget review was employed to
some extent. However, political fortune did not smile on a future of program budgeting
International Public Management Review · electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net
Volume 4 · Issue 1 · 2003 · © International Public Management Network
136
after the election of March 1983. As is the case for many public sector reforms, once
their champions leave office the momentum for implementation is lost or reversed.
A significant event at this time was the issuance of the Reid Report that noted an
absence of managerial competence and inadequate relationships between departments
and control agencies. The report recommended a number of changes including adoption
of a UK style financial management improvement program (FMIP). The Reid report
further suggested budget simplification and greater budgetary assistance from he DOF
to departments, and greater discipline to cause departments to live within their budget
allocations. How were the many recommendations of the Reid report to be
implemented? Was increased delegation of authority also intended? Well, along came
Hawke. If delegation was in mind, it would not be the direction first taken by the new
Labor government.
Bob Hawke (Labor) was elected Prime Minister of Australia in February and took office
in March 1983. In many ways his election was a bell-weather event in the fiscal,
financial and political history of Australia. Hawke faced huge deficits. The economic
outlook was not promising. He organized a smaller 13 member inner cabinet, and a
"troika" consisting of the PM, Treasurer and Finance Minister took control of the reins
of government. The PM created a formal review process under a reestablished
Expenditure Review Committee (ERC). Hawke's personal style was to negotiate, make
decisions and move on to other agenda items he confronted. Clint Eastwood reputedly
once said to a director who wanted to re-shoot a scene, "Was it in focus? OK. Let's
move on." Hawke wanted to "move on" to regain what he perceived as a tremendous
loss of discipline and control over government growth and spending. A centralized
decision structure facilitated "moving on" -- Paul Keating was appointed his Treasurer
and John Dawkins his Minister of Finance. Dawkins was given ministerial oversight
over Finance and the Public Service Board (PSB). His succesor, Peter Walsh, inherited
this position of power and became known for his crusade against "middle class
welfare." Labor was prepared to "take budget rectitude and management seriously."
(159) Walsh became the leader of this endeavor, with Hawke and Keating deferring to
him on expenditure control issues and decisions.
Aggregate spending limits and savings targets were put in place. The authors explain
that while budget reform and expenditure control initiatives were put in place
simultaneously under the Hawke government, these methodologies flowed forth in
separate streams. The ERC managed the expenditure limitation, reduction and enforced
savings efforts. During the 1984 elections Hawke enunciated what became known as the
"Trilogy" commitments. Much like George Bush's statement about "read my lips -- no
new taxes" -- the Trilogy became the benchmark commitment of the second Hawke
government through 1987. What did Hawke promise, "apparently without...
consultation" in his now famous radio interview? (One wonders what Walsh thought of
exactly at the moment when he heard the pronouncement)."The 1984 'Trilogy'
commitments were: not to increase taxes or expenditure as a percentage of GDP over
the life of the Parliament and to reduce the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP over
three years (subject to some important 'let-out' clauses)." (163) Whether intended as a
political "gimmick" or not, friends and critics alike were eager to hold Hawke to his
promises. Huge savings were announced in budgets (e.g., $1.2 billion, $1.5 billion). An
Efficiency Scrutiny Unit (ESU) was established. The efficiency finding approach of the
ESU according to David Shand (1987) was "crash through or crash." (187) In 1983-84
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numerous technical budget reforms were instituted by Finance. The best known reform
was Portfolio budgeting, as mentioned above. The authors note that portfolio budgeting
was perhaps not the approach originally intended. "Arguably, the Hawke government
resorted to portfolio allocation while intending to implement program management and
budgeting (PMB)." (174) PMB required program structures (much like the program
elements in PPBS) to be set for all departments. Without going into the details, this was
an enormous undertaking the government claimed to have succeeded at by the end of
the 1980s. However, considerable dissenting opinion on this point has been registered
both by academic and practitioner critics.
To catch the link to the tale about forward estimates (FEs) rendered above without a
conclusion, by 1992 the process was judged by a Task Force on Management
Improvement to have been, "one of the most successful reforms of the 1980s." (177)
Under the Hawke government the process had been tightened so that estimates were
more reliable. The discipline and accuracy of FEs has been viewed as the "lynchpin" of
the Hawke budget reforms, and a "spur to devolution...Improved forward estimates
became the preferred system of outlay control." (178) The key was rolling the forward
estimates into the budget estimates to increase budget certainty and stability. Also
critical, Finance "imposed" its calculations as the basis for formulating the forward
estimates. By the introduction of the 1987-88 Budget, "wish lists" had been converted to
"hard figures." If no policy changes were endorsed, FE figures could become the
budget. Increased certainty, reliability and simplicity were put into practice. Politically,
Hawke demonstrated that a Labor government could be fiscally conservative. (181)
While the Trilogy criteria were not pursued easily or painlessly (cuts in transfers to state
governments were large), from 1987-88 to 1990-91 Australian governments achieved
budget surpluses.
The book is excellent in telling both the political and budgetary-managerial story of
Hawke's four terms in office, the transition to the Keating "roller-coaster" years of
surplus and deficit and the ambitious initiatives of the Howard conservative (coalition
between Liberal and National parties) government. Implementation of the FMIP and its
discontinuance, the experimentation with "running cost" budgets and carry-forward
provisions, increased delegation of authority to departments and agencies and the new
public management-oriented reforms of the late 1980s and 1990s (the term new public
management does not appear in the book), the practice of annual "clawbacks" where
varying percentages of the budget base were withheld annually, implementation of
output and outcomes budgeting (outcomes as the goals of government, outputs as the
goods and services to be "bought" by government and Parliament), the difficulties of
measurement, the evolution to Parliamentary contracts for services and pricing policy,
the move to accrual and output-price budgets, initiatives to allow departments to retain
user charges and other self-generated revenues, efforts to instill program evaluation tied
to budgeting (that were not successful), the move to more business-like financial and
management practices under the conservatives in the last half of the 1990s -- all the
detail of why these experiments were undertaken and the evaluation of results is
described and analyzed clearly. Well-reasoned analysis (and citation of supportive
sources) of why various reforms were undertaken and how successful they were in
meeting government objectives is richly provided.
The last chapters contribute cogent explanation of why the public sector and budgets
expand over time, comparing various Australian budget years in terms of spending as a
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percent of GDP, and demonstrating why the tasks of deficit reduction and management
of surpluses are so difficult to manage. From their analysis one may conclude that more
success has been achieved over time in reducing deficits than in sustaining surpluses.
This conclusion may be applied to U.S government experience and that of many other
nations. Their analysis is based on the Australian experience but it relates to budgeting
internationally, as the authors intend. The book closes with a brief discussion of the
implication of their findings for budgeting in developing nations. This is the one part of
the book that needs to be rethought (not that it is wrong -- just incomplete), and
expanded with greater attention to the experience of specific developing nations --
should the authors choose to take on this challenge in a revised edition.
Overall, Managing Public Expenditures in Australia achieves its goals in description
and analysis of an era of budgetary and managerial experimentation that is perhaps
more interesting than that of any other nation. The lessons to be learned from the
Australian experience are rendered explicitly by the authors in their final chapter. This
is a must read for students and scholars of budget, financial management and
managerial reform in the public sector the world over.
L. R. Jones is Wagner Professor of Public Management, Graduate School of Business
and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California:
dukedmb@aol.com
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